DICTIONARY PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY JAMES MARK BALDWIN THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited WRITTEN BY MANY HANDS VOL.I.

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1 DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY INCLUDING MANY OF THE PRINCIPAL CONCEPTIONS OP ETHICS, LOGIC, AESTHETICS, PHILOSOPHY OP RELIGION, MENTAL PATHOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, BIOLOGY, NEUROLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, PHILOLOGY, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, AND EDUCATION AND GIVING A TERMINOLOGY IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, AND ITALIAN WRITTEN BY MANY HANDS AND EDITED BY JAMES MARK BALDWIN Ph.D.(Princeton), Hon. DSo.(Oxon.), Hon. LLD.(Glsgow) STUART PROFESSOR IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY WITH THE CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF CONSULTING EDITORS IN THREE VOLUMES WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXTENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHIES VOL.I jj2eto gorfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY ILonHon MACMILLAN AND CO., Limed 1901

2 HEDONISM HEGELS TERMINOLOGY hedonic nd hedouics re better thn lgedonic ndlgedonics (Mrshll). There tendencytobbreve thephrseinto tone nd toned,s toneofsenstion (Bldwin), plesurbly toned (Stout), but tht my led to confusion wh ffective tone, nd should not bedone. The objection tothe compound term plesure-pin (Mrshll) tht does not llow the dtinction between hedonic tone nd the senstions of plesure nd pin, which mny psychologts inst upon. See lso Pin nd Plesure, ndfeel ing. In French element ffectif often used, but fils, s ffective element filsin Englh, to mrk the dtinction between feelingtonendhedonictonendwerecom mendthtbereservedfortheformer. Lerture: Stout, Anlytic Psychol., i. 12 if. Mrshll, Pin, Plesure, nd Aesthetics, chp, i Bldwin, Hndb. of Psychol., Senses ndintellect,114feelingndwill,chp,v nd the ctions under the terms referred to. (J.M.B., G.F.S.) Hedonm: Ger. Hedonmus Fr. hedonme Itl. edonmo. The theory tht ple suretheultimte stndrd (orconstuent) of morl vlue. See Ethicl Theories, nd EUDAEMONISM. (W.R.S.) Hegel, Georg Wilbelm Friedrich. ( ) Born t Stuttgrt, he entered theuniversyt Tubingen s student of theology, receiving msters degree in philo sophy, In th sme yer Schelling entered theuniversy tthe geofsixteen, nd seems to hve stimulted Hegel to greter ctivy. Hegel hd lredy red Rousseu, nd knew something of the Wolffin philosophy. In 1793 helefttubingen,ndbecmeprivte tutorinfmily tberne. Hewrote life of Chrt, studied Knt nd Benjmin Con stnt, nd red for the first time Fichtes Wsenschftslehre, which hd just ppered. In 1797 hebecmetutortfrnkfort,nd there red Plto nd Sextus Empiricus. In 1801 he removed to Jen, nd begn lecturing. Closing h lectures t Jen in i8o6,on ccount ofthewr,heedednewspperin Bmberg until 1808, when he took chrge of the gymnsium t Nuremberg. In 1816 he be cme professor of philosophy t Heidelberg. In1818heremovedtoBerlintotketheplce left vcnt by Fichtes deth. Died t Berlin. See the following topics. Hegelinm or Hegelm. After Hegel (q.v.). See Hegels Terminology (especilly II), Idelm, Eptemology, Philosophy, nd Metphysics. 454 Hegels Terminology (in the Hegelin Philosophy). reltion to I. Generl Nture nd Origin of Hegels Terminology. Amongst the thinkers who, since Artotle, hve undertken to work out reltively independent terminology dequte to the complexy nd to the orgniztion of com plete philosophicl system, Hegel occupies very prominent plce. H terms re chosen, onthe whole,wh verycreful regrd to h own centrl theories. They re, in number of instnces, decidedly novel. Where they re fmilir terms, their mening ltered to such chrctertic doctrine of the system, ccording to which the process, or other object which Hegel nmes by ny term, thefulfilment,or truth,i.e.thecomplete expression, of the mening nd purpose of the processes fmilirlyknownunderthesme nme. The method of nomenclture thus indicted viewed by Hegel himself s justifiedbygenerl prctice ndsofrth seems indeed plin, since fmilir source of technicl nmes the deliberte employ mentofnlredyfmilirterminmening which not only specilized, but specilized throughnemphslid upontendencies or purposes ltent in the populr usge. In Hegels cse,however,thfshionof creting h own terminology, by employing fmilir terms in new wys, rendered decidedly more bffling thn usul by the twofold fct: (1) tht the terms whose sense thus trnsformed relredyoldtechnicl terms,ofpstusge no longer vgue, but, s Hegel himself holds, rther too bstrctly shrp in definion nd (2) thtthechnge fromthetrdionlusge frequently very considerble, nd concerns some of the most originl fetures ofthe Hegelin system. The result tht brief summries of the philosophy of Hegel, in h own terminology, re, s th first cse illus trtes, extremely mleding nd mny of the most fmilir cricms of h system s pnlogm, s reducing life to mere thought, s recognizing no rely but the thinking process, or sidentifying the philo sophizing intelligence wh the bsolute, whtever my be the ultimte justifiction of these cricms, ctully express, s they occur, mere impressions resulting from such view of the whole system, obtined whout grsp ingthe sense ofs terms. Inny cse nottllesytoresttehegelin defini

3 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY tions, whout summrizing the whole of the Logik. As for the sources nd development of Hegels terminology, considerble propor tion of h terms re of course Artotelin nd scholstic in origin, lthough then usully much influenced by the Kntin usge. A portion re specificlly Kntin terms. An other portion re of dtinctly independent nd Germn origin. A considerble influence of populr usgeppers(in such cses s ufheben). Hegel ws fond, like Plto nd Artotle, of etymologicl comments on the supposed originnd mening ofhterms nd in view ofthe stteofthe science of lnguge t the time, h etymologies re often decidedly rbrry. Deliberte plys uponwords relsofrequent. Atthepoint where we first meet wh Hegels technicl vocbulry in ny relly free expression, viz. in the Phnomenologie des Getes (1807), ppers very fully developed, lthough not s rich slterin the Logik. In the former work, some of the ctegories(e.g. Wirklichke, s opposed to Dsein, Sein, &c.) re not uniformly used in the pregnnt sense lter obtining, nd certin number of vguer or of more poeticlly formed terms or phrses do notlter repperwhile, ontheotherhnd, the reltive poverty of the ctegories of the Phcmomenologie hs been frequent topic of complint, especilly mongst the Hegelin cricsofthtwork. TheLogik,inslonger form, ws first publhed In the Encyclopdie der Philosophchen Wsetvschften(t ed. 1817, 2nd ed. 1827), the generl sttement of the whole system, together wh s psychologicl, ethicl, theologicl, nd other terminology, ppers. II. Fundmentl Fetures of the System A8 DETERMINING THE TERMINOLOGY..Ifwenowpprochltlemoreclosely our tsk of explining the min fetures of Hegelin usge, few preliminry observtions stothesystem,viewed swhole,willhelp us. Toknow,whHegel, swh mnyother thinkers, process involving two fctors, nmely, the fctor usully clled experience, nd fctor including vrious constructive processes, of lower or of higher grdes. The dtinguhing fetures of Hegels doctrine depend upon three centrl theses: (1) tht the fctor usully clled experience, nd the other fctor (Knts spontney of the thinking process), cn never be sundered, but 455 re universlly present, in ll grdes of know ledge, however low orhigh (2) tht the lower stges of the knowing process self re identicl in their essentil nture wh the higher, so tht the vrious grdes of knowledge usully dtinguhed s perception, under stnding, reflection, reson, &c, re not essentilly different mentl processes, but re merely successive phses in the evolution of singleprocess(3) thttheknowingprocess, intheses phses, insevolution, ndins entire constution, not only precely corre sponds to, but identicl wh, the essentil nture oftheworld, theobjectortruebeing, whichknown, sothtnotonlythetheory of knowledge cnnot be seprted from metphysic, but lsothetheoryofthe con stution of the universe identicl wh the theory oftheprocessbywhichwe come to know the universe. All these theses re, in mesure, common to the idelm of Fichte, Schelling, nd Hegel but Hegels working outofthetheory in mny wys different from tht of h ideltic contemporries. Of these three theses,thefirsttheonemost commonly munderstood by opponents of the dilectic method (e.g. by Trendelenburg, in the ltter s fmous cricm in h Logche Untersuchungen). It hs been supposed by such crics tht Hegel delibertely intended todeducetheempiriclelementin knowledge wholly from the other, or spontneous, fctor of purethoughtndhegelhsbeenblmed for filing in th essentilly hopeless enter pre. But the cricm founded upon mtken interprettion of Hegels perfectly explic sttement of h posion, s will esily pper from wht follows. 6.Sinceknowledgends object,whthegel himself ultimtely mens by thought nd by being, re not only thus correltive, but in essence identicl, the exposion of the system inthelogiknturllyproceedsinsuchform stobringthresult sclerly spossible to light. Que prt from the techniclies ofthemethod,sspir myingenerl be summrized by sying tht, in our philo sophers opinion, ll the necessry concepts whichlietthebsofhumn science,the ctegories of our thought, cn be mde rightly to pper s themselves prticulr stges in the one process whose generl chrcter hs just been pointed out. The Logik self will be the system ofthese concepts, wh n ccount of the wy in which higher concepts re rtionlly evolved out of lower ones. Of every oneofthese conceptswill betrue,

4 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY ccording to the generl theses of the theory before us,tht tonce concept of typeorgrdeofobject, nd conceptof stgeofknowledge. Btnot lwyswill th double spect be esy toseize s we consider ny oneconceptin question. The objective nd subjective menings, s we here might cll them, belonging to the vrious terms, will be lwys present but sometimes the stge in the evolution of knowledge represented bytheconcept in questionwill beinselfeher tooobjective ortoosub jective, nd sometimes the mere ccidents of trdionl usge will direct the reders mind too much to one side or the other of the mening. Exmples of ctegories tht, by virtue of the stge of evolution which they represent, undertke to be ctegories of fct rther thn ctegories of knowledge, re furnhed by such terms s i$«n, Dsein, Extenz, Ding, Eigenschft, &c. Exmples of ctegories tht re explicly ctegories of the knowing process, re represented by the terms Urtheil nd Schluss, i. e. judgment nd syllogm. More neutrl terms, which in common usge, or t certin stges ofthe ctul htory of philosophicl dcussion, hve hd both their objective nd subjective menings emphsized, re ds Allgemeine nd die Idee. For the Pltonic ides were originlly purely objective truths nd the rely of universls hs often been dcussed. The term Reflection n interesting exmple oftermwhich first suggeststothereders mind the process of subjective reflection, while Hegel frequently emphsizes s objective mening s nmefor rel process. As fct,sofrsthestgeintheevolution of the subject-mtter t ny point perms, ll thetermslikereintended topply bothto stges of wht trdion clls the subjective knowingprocess,ndtogrdesofwht re usully regrded s externl objects or pro cesses. ThusHegel speksof judgment nd syllogm (Urtheil nd Schluss) s objective processes, present in nture or in htory, frequently pplying the former of these two termstonme processes ofdifferention nd divion(especilly those occurring on higher conscious levels), nd the ltter to nme processesof reorgniztion ndoftherecon cilion of divided tendencies. Th tendency in Hegels terminology, whilesjustifiction, totheuthors mind, formsoneofthetheses ofthesystem,oftengiveshlnguge,toone who first meets fntstic, or t ll events, n llegorizing, ppernce, which does not esily psswy,butwhich in nycsemust be regrded s result oftheuthors de liberte intent, so fr s illustrtes the generl theses of the uny of Sein nd Denken. HI. The Dilecticl Method: Generl Fktubes..Themethodof procedurebywhich Hegel pssesfromthelowertothehigher stges,in the development of h Logik, of course the most chrctertic feture of the entire sys tem. Th the fmous dilecticl method. Stted still prt from s technicl detils, tkes two principl forms. The first form especilly pplies to ctegories tht re de fective by being too bstrct, nd tht ly too much stress upon the objective spect of the truth which they contin. They, in generl, re more or less entirely the cte (goriesofimmedicy Unmtdbrke), or, in other words, re ctegories of the world viewed sfct,orsdtum. Theyre,bythegenerl doctrine of the system, imperfect ctegories. Rightly cricized, they re therefore to led to higher ctegories. The process of ccom plhing th end process of showing tht the fct-world relly world of reltions mongst fcts, or tht s truth reltive, so tht wht given ctegory ttempts to define 6 if 6 6 b. s lone, or s lone, turns out, upon nlys,tomenreltedto Th reltion ofto lsopperstoouruthors minds fcttht we grsp onlyinthetrnsion (Uebergng)from to sothtingenerl we find tht, wefirsttrytoholdlone, ndthentodetermine whtmens, wed cover, often to our surpre, nd generlly wh cler sense of some contrdiction thus brought tolight, tht mens eher us oneofs ownspectsor (especilly inthe lower nd therefore less stble ctegories) s something opposed to self, into which nevertheless turns under our very hnds, s we endevour to stte s mening. Hereupon, we observe tht the true cn bedefined only by tking explic ccount of only by trnsion from one ctegory to the other, nd only by the further explic recognion of theuny (Einhe) ofnd in something whose nture ppers s one involving the foresid relted to Th new uny, mdeexplic,now gets some nme,let us sy nd ppers s higher ctegory of theseries,which,in generl,willhvetobe treted in the sme fshion. The Einhe 456 c, b. b b, b,

5 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY selfofnd 6does notmentheirsimple bsolute fcts. Herethemethodin generl identifiction but just s ny one spce consts in showing tht the development before us involves both right nd left direc oftheidel process,ndofllthecomplex tions,orboth up nddown,ndthusthe interreltionships which th involves, self unyofupnddown,rightndleft,whout fct, lw of truth, reltively independent, involving the mere confusion of these vrious through s very universly, of the single directions, soinc,nd 6rebrought into subjective stges through which hsbe uny, whout our now losing sight of their comeexplic, so tht, in dcovering the differences, which the whole procedure hs inevble chrcter of given process of only mde more explic. The contrdiction thinking, we hve dcovered the only truth ltent intrying todefinelone hsthus tht, t th stge, there toknow. Th been first brought to light, nd then sublted truth now becomes once more, in higher or ufgehoben. sense, unmtelbr or immede. We now b.a simple exmple ofth form ofthe experience s ctuly. Th form of the dilecticl method found t the outset of dilecticl method used in Hegels restte the Phdnomenologie, where common sense ment of the ontologicl proof of Gods chllenged to point out some object which extence ppers very notbly in the certinly known for wht, in our experience, trnsion from Subjektivt to ObjektiviU in. Thefirstnswer undertken bycom thethirdprtofthelogik. Ingenerl mon sense : Th object, viz. the object used ginst sceptics, ginst Knt, ginst thtiherend now seeortouch Th Fichte, nd ginst subjectivm of ll sorts. known tomedirectly. Hegelsreply:But In substnce consts in sying, first, wht th object1 Wht does thmen1 tht some point of view, or idel construction, Hethenpoints out,invrious wys,thtthe hs now given us demnd, or fully nme th, ipso fcto, pplies to ny object developed need, for certin system of con whtever found in experience, so tht, insted ceptions, orof reltionships,, &c. ofreporting sknowledge ofsinglefcts secondly, tht the question hereupon res, such,common sense hstodefinesknow whether ny objective truth corresponds to ledge,sofr,sthemostgenerl,vgue,nd th idel demnd nd thirdly, tht, cre indefine knowledge possible, mere know fully considered, the idel demnd, by s ledgeofthnessin generl,orofsomewht very universly nd necessy, hs shown herendnow so tht th,merely sth, selftocover thewhole ground which ny menssyetnything, orsgoodsnothing. object could here occupy, so tht the fully Theresult, sofrshereconcerns us, grown Begriff self the object sought, the curtin the picture, nd the thought the being. Thebsforthuseofthedilec ticl method thesme sthtemployedby ny idelt who intends to show tht the completed mening of system of ides, tht the only knowble objects re much more thnmerelysinglefctsgivenssuch,viz.s th. The known objects of experience in volve reltions between th nd tht, now nd then, here nd there, nd re ccordingly interrelted msses of differented experi ence e.g. n object seen ginst bck ground, orthingwhich onebyvirtueof ndincontrsttos mny qulies, &c. The other form of the dilecticl method often involves, t the prece point where occurs, less pprent prdox, lrgely becuse, b, c, d, identicl wh ll tht the mind seeksin looking for objective truth. These two forms of the dilecticl method, lthough developed wh gret thoroughness nd originly by Hegel, re in origin not tllpeculirto himself. The two prin ciples involved, viz. Thtfcts reknowble only s interrelted, nd the universl we re better prepred for when s stge reched. It moreover, of type more lws idel processes, tken together wh the generlly chrctertic of modern ideltic processes which embody theselws,reequiv systems, whether Hegelin or not. It used lent toll tht properly to bement by when our ctegories hve reched some more rely, re not unfmilir to students of explicly subjective stge, when the reltivy philosophy, que prt from Hegels system. ofourworld lredy recognized, nd when The peculir reltion which Hegel brought to the purpose to show tht the subjective pss between these principles nd the logicl meningin question lso n objective men principles of identy, contrdiction, nd ing, or tht our moreexplicly idel pro excluded middle, hs led to considerble cesses re lso expressive of the essence of munderstnding, nd the form of sttement 457 of

6 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY hs rendered the system difficult to survey in s wholeness. Lerture: Trendelenburg, Ueber die dilektche Methode, in vol. i of Logche Untersuchungen J. Ell McTggrt, Studies in the Hegelin Dilectic Georges Noel,LLogiquedeHegelWllce,Prole gomentohegelslogic (2nd ed.),remong the best dcussions of the specil topic here in question. Trendelenburgs view hs been, for Hegels crics, extremely influentil, nd very skilfully stted, despe s defects. IV.The Most Generl Termsofthe System Experience of the Dilectic Process. In following the vrious stges of the dilecticl process, one meets wh good mny terms which re repetedly used, not to define ny of the individul ctegories, but to chrcterize the presupposions nd occur rences which re more or less universl throughout the process. These my here best betken,firstinorder, s the most generl terms of the entire system.. The word unmtelbr, or immede, s employedbyhegel, thefirstofthetermsof mostgenerl useinthesystem. Th term primrily refers both to the presence nd to the pprent lck of reltionships which first seem to chrcterize objects when tken s sensetkesthem,orwhenviewed sflsely bstrct thinking views them. Artotles proposions clled 3/u would be viewed by Hegel s lso reltively immede, but Hegel pplies the word to numerous other objects. But immede, in secondry nd higher sense, lso refers to chrcter observble inlltruth, evenfrom thehighest pointof view. Unmtelbr, in reltive sense of the term,, textbutthesemeningsrellderived from thegenerlmenings: unreltedndrelted given nd explined elementry nd de veloped inil nd resultnt. In mtters of prcticl import, unmtelbr cn often be trnslted by unwon or unerned. Thus the object of given vgue pln ppers s merely unmtelbr, whenwehve syetnoideof themensbywhich towin the possession of unerned powers involves n immedicy to which wehvesyetnoexplicright,&c. The universl lw, principle, or process of Vermtelung, or of the whole evolution, both of thought ndof things, termed Negtivt. Thterm,oneofthemostdifficultin Hegels usge, suggests in one word the entire system. Negtivt principle both of destruction b. nd of production. Tht which Negtivt produces, on the posive nd objective side of s work, first precely the world tht t the outset the philosopher empiriclly finds s the relm of immedicy, the whole universe of experience. Upon s destructive.nd subjective side, Negtivt, s the principle determining the process of knowledge, next ppers s denying or sublting the pper nce of mere immedicy which chrcterizes th world, nd so s both destroying bstrc tionsndreducingtheworldoffcttorelm of universl reltivy. Negtivt finlly, s the negtion of the negtion, ppers, in new constructive tsk, s the process whereby thertionl unyof thought, ndofthingsof immedicy nd medion, of experience nd reson, comes to light, in the posive system ofthephilosopher. In consequence,negtivt expliclynmeslworprocessbothofthings ndofknowledge. Th lw, gin, ons objective side, the principle tht everything merely immede flse, trnsient, nd illusory, but tht the very constution nd evolution of the rel world, s whole, depends uponthveryfct. Intheprocessofd plying th trnsiency of every fine fct, in the conflicts due to the resulting contrdictions, ndinthebringingtolightoftheillusions, theverylifendctuly ofthewholeouter or objective universe consts. Even the posi tive construction of the objective empiricl for the first, ny strting-point, or beginning, or presupposion vermtelt,ormeded,on the contrry, ny result or consequence (cf. Werke, 2nd ed.,iii. Logik, 39). In still more obvious wy, however, fcts, tken s such, things, mere senstions, first pper to us s unmtelbr, nd we only grdully dcoverthttheyrevermtelt,in sofr s they stnd in reltions, whout which they world by the principle of Negtivt con provetobemeningless ndsoretheresult sequently full of reltively destructive pro of condions, both subjective nd objective, cesses. The vible universl thus the which forbid us to tret them s lone. incorportion of the principle clled Neg Numerous specil shdings re given to the tivt, which, s Hegel sometimes sys, might mening of these two terms, unmtelbr nd beclleddieseeleder Welt. vermtelt, by the subject-mtter nd the con The bsolute possesses Negtivt s s 458

7 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY own principle or lw. If one tkes the bsolute bstrctly, views prt from the worldinwhichexpressesself (s thephilo sophicl mystics love bstrctly to view the bsolute), or in similr mnner regrds ny principle sifcould beolted from s mnifesttions, the bsolute, or the principle inquestion, then possesses wht Hegelclls reine oder sich uf sich beziehende Negtivt, pure or self-relted, or self-centred, Negtivy. Th implies thtsuchbsolute, tken thus in bstrcto, would be self-denying essence, sichuf sich beziehende Negtivt, orn ide which ws self-relted only in th negtive wy (cf. Logik, nd prt, Werke, iv-ii, 31)- c.anyuny,i.e.nywholemening orob ject, which exemplifies in prticulr cse the principle of negtivy, by combining whin self differented, opposed, but relted con tents, frequently clled negtive Einhe (seelogik,2ndprt, Werke,iv.42). Sothe uny of consciousness notble cse of negtive Einhe. The exerce of NegtivcU, or n ct which exemplifies especilly in s first or more destructive spect, but lso, on occsion, in s constructive spect, nct for which Hegel usestheverb ufheben. Ofthword he gives full ccount in Logik, Werke, iii Aufheben nd vermteln, he here tells us, re very lrgely synonymous. In populr lnguge ufheben lredy m biguous, since mensbothtodestroyndto ly side for keeping. Hegel ttrcted by thdouble sense, which seems to him n instnce of unconscious specultive thought. He ccordingly gives the verb s technicl, terizing the stges in the development of other ctegories..abstrkt ndconcrethve,inhegel, n opposion not identicl wh the more fmilir technicl usge. Wh him n individul object my be so tken s tomke pper bstrct, while ny universl principle becomes concretejustin proportion s becomes true. if Hegels use of bstrkt includes, however, most of the ordinry pplictions, nd more ex tensive. Anyobject bstrct,in sofrs viewed in flse oltion from s genuine reltions, or something in the world of objective things nd processes, when ppers s fct prt. In the objective sense, Robinson Crusoe lone on the lnd would be reltively bstrct individul, becuse he could not live whole humn life when themnfridycme, Crusoe ndh life were lredy more concrete, for mn livesinreltion tohkind. bstrkt differs fromunmtelbr, insofrstheformer more esily pplies to the cses which ordinry usge lso clls bstrct, viz. to cses where A reltion bstrcted from s terms, principlefrom s pplictions, &c. But true, of course, tht reine Unmtelbrke in Hegels sense n bstrction. However, unrntelbr connotes presence, whilebstrkt primrily refers only to oltion. Concret, on the other hnd, ny whole, especilly when s orgniztion explic. The unyof vrious contents the concrete (Gesch. d. Philos., Werke, xiii. 37, Einl. pssge inwhich the conceptoftheconcrete very fullydevelopednd illustrted). Philosophy, therefore, insted of being confined to bstrc tions, relly dels, ccording to our philo usge. sopher, wh the most concrete object, nmely, the orgnic uny clled theworldor the V. Further Generl Terminology. The bsolute. Stges of the Development ofverm- telung. n sich nd s correltives, form closely The expressions next on our foregoing lt, connected nd very chrctertic phrseology, Wenow come to series of generlly which recursinour philosophers dcussion pplied expressions, for the vrious degrees of ctegories of every grde. in which ny object, or ctegory, my mnifest If delibertely dweltupon insunmtel eher reltively pure immedicy, or some brke, ny object viewed n sich. It form of explic medion. These expressions so viewed especilly when one returns to such re the chrctertic phrses nd ephets: immede view by deliberte ignoring of Abstrkt, Concret, n sich, n sich oder fiir uns, other objects. But thus viewed not only nihmornihm selbst, fiirsich,nundfur flsely viewed, but bs for truer views, sich, gesetzt, bestimmt together wh vrious n bstrction out of which the more concrete bstrct nouns, such s Ansichsein, Fiirsichsein, Bestimmung, Bestnmthe, Beschffenhe, wy n sich comes to men ltent, undeveloped, form of these truer views develops. In th which, while hving plce mongst the not overt, s one cn spek of theinfnt ctegories, re principlly useful s chrc Shkespere s lredy, or n sich, born 459 b.

8 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY poet. Forevenindwellingupontheinfnt s infnt, one necessrily interprets the infnt intermsofwhttocome. For the sme reson, n sich my become wholly equivlent, insome contexts,tothescholsticin potenti. In cse of mentl processes, n sich my menunconscious, sthe mnwhohtesh brother nsichmurderer (or murderer in h hert), lthough he perhps does not recognize how murderous h hte. Th sense of unconscious frequent in the Phdnomenologie. All these menings hve both objective nd subjective pplictions. TheKntin sense ofnsich,ccording to whichnsichmensindependentof conscious ness, often enough used in ctions from Knt, nd in cricms of tht philosopher, ndbyhegelconnectedwhthenotionof bstrct (nd secondry) immedicy, which ccording to Hegel belongs to objects, precely in so fr sthey reconceived to beinde pendent eher of consciousness or of other things. An sich in ll s menings differs from unmtelbr, minly by s greter intensy, viz. by virtue of the still more deliberte ignoring of reltions which in mindwhen n object tken, not merely scomes,butwhexpressefforttosunder fromotherobjects,ndtoviewbyself orgin,whennobjectppersintheworld insuchwe sthus tolystress upon the bsence, or the complete ltency, of s reltions. Ds Unmlelbre, in s first or lower forms, hs s yet noreltions but wht nsichtries, swere,todown them(logik, Werke, iii. 119: In sofrs nything in self, whdrwn from reltion to other, nd from otherness ). c. The peculirly Hegelin phrse n ihm, equivlent ccording to the uthor to n sich, whnemphslid uponthen(loc. c., 20), mostnturllyto be usedeherin the form, Etws ht n ihm ny given chrcter, or lso in the form, Estnihm, 1 nmely, n etws, th sme chrcter. Hegel justifiestheusge sofrby ppeltosuch populr phrses s, Es t nichts drn. Hegel, however, in sufficiently brbrous fshion, cpble of sying dss ds Etws ds,wsesnsicht,uchnihmt (loc. c., 123),sothtnihmbecomes predictive phrse, which not esily intelligible prt from the technicl explntion. Th expln tion thtnihmrefersto chrcter which, subjects reltions to others. If mns ltent trs of chrcter, never yet expressed in h conduct, were supposed to be reveled by h fetures, physiognomt would sy thtwhtthemnin himself(nsich) lsonihm,tht,belongstohimsfeture, or in him fter ll(stirling, Secret of Hegel, new edion of 1898, 399, renders the force of n ihm s the mnifestble peculir nture ofs object). Inbrief,then,while the n sich of ny being nme for chrcters which re, possible, to be dwelt upon by ignoring th beings reltions to others, ndwhilethe n sich therefore nme for bstrct, fundmentl, but ltent nd brely potentil fetures, n ihm refers to chrcters tht seem externlly ttributed to the being in question, sothtthey re more mnifest, nd re more such chrcters s indicte reltions. A nme for the chrcters which being, s consequence of if, snsich,ororiginlndltentnture,hs n ihm, the Bestimmung, or voction, destiny,power,cpcy, ofbeing,s fness for externl reltionships (Logik, loc. c., 23). Th term trnslted by Stirling (op. c., 259) s qulifiction, nd interpreted by the sme uthor (op.c., 399) s tht to which the something (Etws) dequte. Bestimmung opposed to Bestimmthe by Hegel (loc.c.) s cpcy totheprticulr stte, the define condion or ctivy embodying th cpcy. If the Bestimmung fulfilled, one hs Bestimmthe proper, the reltion between the two being much tht of firstctndsecond ctinscholstictermino logy. Thus the Bestimmung des Menschen, the voction or cpcy of mn, to be resonble, or Reson (so Hegel himself, loc. c.) but h thinking ctivy, h Denken, the fulfilment of th cpcy, h Bestimmthe. d.ingenerl,nybeing bestimmt, in so fr s s determinte fetures bring into 1 contrst wh externl beings. Bestimmen the verb which expresses the process of dding the specific differences, or differentie, to the more generl chrcters of nything. Bestimmthe involves, when externlly viewed, Beschffenhe (by Stirling ingeniously rendered tlifiction), whereby thing ppers likethorthtwhen involved in chncereltions tootherthings. The Beschf fenhe thus nerly llied to Artotles in more externl nd overt fshion, so ccident, s in the well-known Artotelin in subject, orrther, sonemight sy, exmple Yourenotcultivted insofrs ttched to th subject, s to determine the you reyou e.in yourself), butinsofr 460 : (i.

9 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY sthhsoccurredtoyou. Sothe Beschffenhe revels the Bestimmung, but in more ccidentl nd externl wys. «.Abeingfiirsichinsensestill more dvnced. When chrcters no longer ltent hve been so developed, when reltionships no longer ignored hve become so explicly included inthedefinion ofbeing,tht nowppers cpble of genuine independence, s n internlly relted whole of mening, given feture, sserted to belong to ny object, tkenfursichwhenthindependence not yet the explic result of presupposions, insted upon, or when, in the objective world, or not yet vermtelt, but ppers s fct such independence ppers to ssert self. whose potentilies we, the philosophizing Antom, Leibnzin mond,orkntin reders, predict in dvnce, or observe, while utonomous morl subject, undertkes to be theyreyet,intheobject self,onlyltent. fursich. Fursichseintherefore suchinde Wht ltentthusbecomes thesme swht pendent being s,for some define reson, observetobeintheobject weexternlly nd ppers to include system of internl rel therefore wht n sich sofrjustfor us, tions, nd to cut off externl reltions (cf. or observble from our point of view. Encyk., Werke, vi. 189 Logik, Werke, iii. l65>- A beingnund fursichin sofr s s sserted independence ltogether the VI. Otheb Teems.. Very chrctertic of th system the developed result of s nture, so tht wht seriesofgrdes ofbeing,orofgrdtions of in self fullyjustifies ssserted inde the extentil predicte. These re Sein, pendence of externl reltions. Th stge Dsein (including Reldt), Extenz, Wirklichke,Svbstntilt, nd Objektivdt. To lso clled Beichsein, nd the compound An-und-fursichsein lsoemployed(encyk., syofgivenobjectmerely,est, not, for Werke, vi. 161 Logik, Werke, iv. An-undfiirsichsein Hegel, spregnnt nssertion stosy,es belongs, in the highest sense extirt. Still more do you sy you ssert, only, to the bsolute, but often ttributed Es t wirklich. The most pregnnt ssertion to the lter ctegories nd to conscious beings on the lt would be, Es ht Objektivdt. An of higher grdes. object my possess Sein whout hving Astotheterms gesetztndgesetztsein, Extenz. When Hegel sserts, in wellknown must be observed tht ny chrcter pssge, lies Verniinflige t wirklich, gesetzt in sofrs explicly shown to result und lles Wirkliche t verniinftig, he does from thenture oftheobject towhich not men tht whtever exts rtionl, for referred. Gesetztsein mens the condion or prtof Hegels thesthtmuchofthe stteofbeing thus gesetzt. Thusthe born merely phenomenl, but still extent, world poet,orpoetnsich,who showshimselfin contins chnce, i.e. irrtionl contingency, youth tohvethebestimmung ofpoet,or while only the notion ctul or toirklich. tohvepoetryinhim (n ihm),ortoberthe Hegels ontologicl phrseology must therefore mrks of (stilln ihm), be crefully considered in interpreting h / 5). not yet gesetzt s poet until by originl production he hs lived up to h erly prome. Gesetzt directly trnslted s posed. Stirling pointsout(op.c., 368) how numerous re the consequences of th cen trl conception of Gesetztsein. It gesetzt, sys Stirling, mens, developed into s proper expliction, sttement, expression, enuncion, exhibion, &c. Agin, Geselztes, finl observtion must here be mde, in closingthseriesofterms,stotheinterest ing nd frequent expression, An sich oder fiir uns. As Hegel extremely nxious to d tinguh, in the progress of the dilecticl method, between wht so fr explic (gesetzt) nd wht thus fronlyltent or potentilinthedevelopmentof nyconception, he frequently hs occsion to inst tht A s not self-referent, but lunr, stellic, prsic, secondry, derivtive. Still other derived senses pper in Stirlings view, in vrious pssges but thesecnusully be mde cler from the context. minte being, 461 A if : mening. Th, to be sure, lesstrueofthe Phdnomenologie thn of Hegels lter works, since in the Phdnomenologie the ontologicl vocbulry less clerly differented. In prticulr our terms men s follows : Sein the nmefor pure immedicy s such. Everything nd nything the vguest fncy or drem, in so fr s possesses immedicy. But pure immedicy tken bsolutely in self, s merely self, whout definions nd contrsts, would be the sme s nothing. Hence the ctul cses of immedicy ll possess Dsein, or deter i. e.beingththssomesortof

10 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY Bestimmtlie, or contrst wh other beings. Dsein would be possessed, so fr, by ny object wh chrcters, e.g. house, orny prt of the universe, viewed merely s dtin guhble prt,butlsobyrinbow, flsh oflightning, tsteorsmell,ornyetws. But such n Etws primrily bestimmt, s Dsein involves s determintion. Only the precely determinble, then, present in theworldofdsein. Ifonesysththeex periences something, we nturlly sk, Wht? Iftherenonswer nming thedetermin tionsoftheetvmsinquestion,wehvetosy tht nothing inprticulr, nd th indefineness,if complete,would sendusbck toreinessein,whichginequltonichts. But now, s Spinoz ffirmed, omn determintio est negtio, nd so determintion, or Bestimmthe, implies contrst wh, nd so negtion of, some other determinte chrcter, ndeveryetwsopposedtoeinanderts,s negtion or other(s light contrsted wh drkness,&c). Such contrst, s universl feture of Dsein, includes the twofold chrcter tht every Etws posive, in so fr swht ndnegtive,insofr s fully developed necessry nture of s excludes the other. The posive things. chrcter, whereby light, for instnce, light, c. Objektivt the grde of being possessed s opposed to the negtive chrcter, whereby by n object which explicly fulfils or ex light not drkness, Hegel clls the Relt presses system of rtionl ides, thoughts, ofnyetws,sopposedtosnegtion. So or lwstht lso subjectively conceived. tht the term Relt used,inthesenseof Th ctegory differs from Wirklichke chiefly thekntin tbleof ctegories (see Knts by virtue of the more explic prior sundering Terminology), to men the posive spect ofofthe idel spect of the world from s thebestimmthe or differenti ofnydeter immede spect. To sy tht thing minte being whtever (cf. Encyk., Werke, wirklich implies, indeed, tht expresses vi. 80 Logik, Werke, iii. 109ff.). The wht cn be defined s lw or rtionl difference between th usge nd eher the chrcter but one my first ccept the scholstic usge orthesenses ofrelymore Wirklichke s n immede fct, nd then common in recent dcussion must be noted. observe s constution, s student of Extenz, s opposed to Sein, Dsein, nd polics first regrds the stte s n ctuly, Relt, much higher ctegory, nd, nd then nlyses s structure. But when though expresses lter form of immedicy, one ffirms Objektivt, one does so fter belongstotheworldofwesen, e. of explicly defining lws, subjective principles, systems meded or reltive being, to the world of of rtionl interreltionships, which lredy principles ndof phenomenl expressions of hvetheir inner or priorivlidy nd principles. The typicl cse of Extenz ny physicl thing, wh qulies. Th hs 1 6., i. l grde of being, not merely involving, like Dsein, or like colours nd rinbows, con trsts wh other beings of the sme grde, but pointing bck to explntions, through principles,ofthebs (Grund) upon which the things extence depends, or which mnifests, even in s immedicy. Wht hs Extenz vironment. lso in interction wh s en Wirklichke still higher ctegory. Wht hs Extenz reltively immede fct, but ppers s the result of condions, nd s relted to n environment. But wht hs Wirklichke not only hs bs, or explicly the expression of principle, but contins th bs whin self, so tht reltively (in thecomplete csewholly) independent of ny environment. It then, higher instnce both of FursicJein nd of An-und-fiirsichsein. If physicl thing wh qulies hs Extenz, n orgnm, commonwelth, solr system, or ny such reltive totly (Tolldt), possesses Wirk lichke. In the most genuine sense, only the bsolute would be wirklich, but the term, often employed for fine but reltively orgnic beings(logik,werke, iv.113,115 ff., 120, Encyk., Werke, iv. 250, ff. f., 253, 282ndcf.theintrod.totheEncyk., iv. 10). The type of Wirklichke htoriclly repre sentedbyspinozs substnce possesses, for Hegel, thegrde of being which he nmes Substntilt, nmely, Wirklichke conceived necessy. When one sserts of these systems tht they lso possess the immedicy exemplified, on lower stges, by Dsein, Extenz, &c, then, nd not till then, one deling wh the 462 grde of being defined s Objektivt. The systems of things subject to lw or expressive ofpurpose, which wefind innture ndin htory, possess therefore not only Wirklich ke, but lso Objektivt s,forinstnce,one my sy Purpose nobjective fctinthe :

11 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY universe(encyk., Werke, vi. 365 Logik, In sense (1) wecn spek ofvrious Be Werke, v. 167 ff.). griffe, e. of the Begriffe of individuly, of Objektivt possessed, in s own highest the universl, of the syllogm or,gin,we grde, by the completely fulfilled or expressed cn spek of ll the previous ctegories of Whrhe, or truth, which Hegel clls the Sein nd Wesen s, on their subjective side, Idee,or,inother words,bythe life or self of Begriffe. So fr Begriff then clss the universe, the concrete embodiment of the nme. principle of Negtivt, lso techniclly clled In sense (2), which the most importnt the Subject-Object. The Idee t once nme for the bsolute, nd for the worldprocess, tken in ll s stges, but here viewed s logicl ctegory {Logik, Werke, v. 2298".). d.incontrst tothetermsforthecte gories of immedicy stnd the terms for the processes nd results of medion or of the process of thought. The term Gednken often usedbyhegeltonmewht reby ordinry usge clled thoughts, nmely, bstrct thoughts the ordinry concepts. In th nrrower sense, however, Gednken re but ff. frgments of the true Denken nd the purpose of the philosopher to led such mere Gednken to the uny of the Begriff. For the generl definion of Gednke, s subjective nd individul occurrence, see Encyk., Werke, " 355 *ne frequent nrrower use exemplified in the Vorrede to the Phnomenologie, Werke, ii. 24 The term Begriff self hs been vriously trnslted butstirlings choice ofnotion, ccepted lso by"wllce, hsnow, onthe whole, possession of the field. good del could besidinfvourofthetermmening, strnsltion of Begriff, were possible to fix th essentilly fluent populr term to ny technicl usge. The very fluency of the term mening would tend to suggest Hegels conception of wht the Begriff to ccomplh, nd s neutrl reference eher to objective or to subjective mening, nd eher to volionl end or to intellectul significnce, would be in conformy whthepurposeofhegel. i > 7,, f. A g. ofthethree,ndwhich onemycllthefirst concrete sense, the term Begriff hs both n objective nd subjective ppliction. It nmes () theprinciplewhich,justbecuse tht of Denken, the rel principle which governs the whole universe, nd which ex presses self therein nd th use of the term veryfrequentin Hegels terminology, not only here,butinother works thn the Logik. Or (b) nmes the philosophicl processof subjectively pprecing thenture nd mening of th principle. Th subjective useofthetermbegriff,onthewhole,pre dominnt in the Phdnomenologie, nd never bndoned. It ppers in thelogik, nd Hegel himself uses the terminology subjektiver und objektiver Begriff. Sense (3) ppersinthetletothdivion, nd veryesilyderived fromsense (2). It the second concrete sense in which Begriff used. As for the further nture of th principle (the Begriff) self, we now know in generl, fromtheccountlredygivenof Negtivt only tht term explicly n bstrct noun. But Begriff, when employed wh objective reference in sense (2), generlly prt from specil menings, lmost lwys em ployed to nme concrete embodiments the principle, or the principle s concretely em bodied. Negtivt therefore stnds to Begriff verymuchinthereltion inwhich,inscho lstic terminology, Delts stnds to Deus. Negtivt the Qult of the Begriff. Sense (3) bove enblesus,lsoinconcrete The term Begriff totheprocessofctive fshion, tospekofthewholeworld s the medion clled Denken, precely wht the Begriff. term Sein to the contents nd processes of TheBegriff (in senses 2, 3), s Hegel theworldofimmedicy inthefirstdivionof often declres (e.g. Logik, Werke, v. 12), thelogik. Begriff, nmely,: (1) generl Spinozs Substnz set free, or turned into nmefor ny oftheindividul orreltively seprble processes nd products of Denken, nd here especilly for the erlier stges of Denken (2) nme for the principle, lw, or living mening which expresses self in thewhole evolution ofdenken (3) col lective, or better, here, n orgnic nme for the whole course of the evolution self, con things, virtue of the dcussion of the ceived s n objective world of rtionl fct. ctegories of Objektivt. In ny cse, wht, of subject. In th sme sense, tken wh objective reference, one cn spek of the Begriff in the terms bove used in speking of theideeonlythtintheidee,sthefinl formofthebegriffself, thespect ofim medicy hs fully returned to th principle of the universl medion of thought nd of 463 by

12 HEGELS TERMINOLOGY ws first expressed s Sein, nd then s Wesen, now to be fulfilled s Begriff. Tht lone cnberelwhich ofthe nture of the life, principle, or mening tht determines the whole process of Denken. So much, then, for the terms Denkttn, Gednke, nd Begriff. e. The wy in which Ifegtivdt ppers s the chrcter of the Begriff next notble. The Begriff, s the principle which determines both thoughtnd things, tobenotonly self-relted nd self-differenting process, but process whose differentions hve exctly thetypeobservble in self-consciousnets of ll grdes. Self-consciousness, s Hegel never wery oftelling us, uny,t first immede or bstrct. Th uny, how ever, preserves self just by exercing self in overcoming, nd reducing to the service of sown desire,orwill,orconception,orin sight, countless fcts tht t first view re foreign to s own nture. It thus involves medion, wh constnt rewinning of imme dicy. Tht how ny mn lives, whether mterilly or spirully. The logicl ccount of the Begriff will hve therefore first to stte the universl dynmics of th selfconscious process in the most universl form. Hegel here clls the first, or immede, spect of the Begriff, s bstrct universly (bstrkte Allgemeinhe). Its medion through vrietyoflife,will, experience,menings,fine individuls,&c, he clls in generl s Sich- Bestimmung or s Besonderfie, s prticu lry. ThedevelopedBegriff,in differenting self into vriety of Bestimmungen, which, while held whin the developing universl, mystill intheir immedicy seem tfirst foreign to s one mening,comes to self precely so fr s, wh concrete Allgemeinhe (orconcreteuniversly),recognizes these prticulrs s whin self, nd s even in their immedicy still s own mening. The fine fcts ofthe lifeofthe Begriff,the individuls of fine experience, the vrious Extenzen, &c, re thus whin the concrete universlofthewholelifeofthetruebegriff. The three terms, universl, prticulr, nd singulr (or individul), like the originl terms unmtelbr nd vermtelt, my fre quently chnge plces in their ppliction but throughout their dcussion the min conception remins, s just stted, constnt. The process present the one originlly clled Negtivt, but now present s consciousprocess.itprocessof sserting uny through self-differention, nd through bringing the results gin into orgnic rel tions. The outcome of the process uny, essentilly the uny of Self-Consciousness, wherein ll fine individuly present whinunion (Einhe) ofallgemeinhe nd Besonderhe ( The oneundivided soulof mny soul ofshelleys fmilir phrse). Hegel, in generl,definesthunion sthe ctegory of Einzelnhe, or individuly, the ctegory, onemight sy,oftheunyofthe mnyin the one. These three, the ctegories of the Begriff, viz. Allgemeinhe, Besonderhe, nd Einzeln he,retobeunderstood,liketherestofthe dcussion, wh reference to the specil nture ofhegels own Begriff. They rethen not the merely trdion conceptions known under these nmes. Inthelter developments of th divion of the Logic, the concrete uni versl becomes explicly identicl wh n infine individul(in Hegels technicl sense ofinfine s developed bove in (7), viz. completely self-determined individul). /. Theprticulrmedionsofthe Begriff, in s primry or more subjective forms, occur through the development of the doctrines of Urtheil nd Schluss. These, the principl sections of the trdionl Logic, re incorpo rted by Hegel into h own theory in gretly ltered form, nd wh deliberte effort to give them n interprettion which my lso be stted s n objective process. An UrtheU processof mking differenti tion nd the opposion of relted terms ex plic. No judgment, therefore, subjectively evpressive ofwhole truth, nd nocorre sponding objective process finl one. Every judgment one-sided, prticulr expression ofnegtivt, nd psses wy into some higher formofjudgment, orinto thttruer expressionofthe Begriff,theSchluss. In prticulr, judgment depends upon opposing fine individuls, prticulrs nd universls, in vrious degrees of bstrction, one to n other, nd then endevouring to hold their uny lso bstrctly before the mind, despe theopposion. Thehigherformsof judgment express more nerly the orgnic union of fine individuls or prticulrs in inclusive universl wholes but no judgment cn rech thefinluny,ndthetruthofthejudgment the Schluss. The Schluss s subjective process, n effort to express the uning prin ciple or JUle (middle term), nmely, the very selfhood of truth self, which binds the mny prticulrs of differented experience intheunyofsingleconsciouswhole. The objective correspondent of the subjective pro 464,

13 ,. HELIOTROPISM HELL cess clled Schluss ny expression of n orgniclly unifying principle in the relm of truth self. The ctegories of ScMvs, pre cely s the necessy of such union becomes mnifest, tend themselves to ssume more one-sidedly objective chrcter, nd the truth of the Schluss the relm of Objektivt lredy considered (see bove,(7)) relm where objects re known s expressing rtion ly in s wholeness. When these objects re once more reflectively regrded s objects duetoidel demnds,nd so not merely s, corresponding to Denken, but produced by thecircleofthformofidelm completed inthe Idee. TheIdee self, in s freest mnifesttion s bsolute Idee, the highest possible logicl definion of Hegels Absolute self. (j.e.) GLOSSARY. (The numbersndlettersrefertothesectionsnd prgrphsofth rticle.) Absolute Idee, VI. Gesetztsein, V.f. Abstrkt, V.. Grnd, VI. I, b. I, 6. 4, b. 6, /. d. e, d, I, 6, 4. b, "i 6, t 6. b, Totlot, VI. Eigen,chft,n.4. Einhe,III.o,IV.e. Uebergng, III.. Einzelnhe.t,VI.e. Unmtelbr,III. Esextirt,VI..,V J. /. 4 6, 6. < IV. Es ht Objektivt, VI. o. Unmtelbrke, III.. -iru ttt Urtheil. n- VL?" ^ 4, 4. 6> / Eetwirklich,VI.. Etws, VI.. Vermteln, IV., c, V. Extenz, II. VI. Vermtelung, IV. Vernttnftig, VI.. Pursich,V.«. Fiirsichsein, V. e. Whrhe, VI. e. Gednke, VI. d. Wesen, VI. Wirklich, VI.. Geset, V./. Wirklichke, 4. I, 4. VI. 4. Heliotropm see Tbopm. Hell [AS. heln, to hide]: Ger. HbUe Fr. enfer Itl. inferno. The plce where lost sinners bide, suffering endless punh ment, nd keeping compny wh the devil nd wh devils. Like mny other words which hve : gthered n import tht the result of the ssocions of centuries, the term hell commonly used whout ny very exct conception of s mening tken symboliclly. To gin further inform tion, one turns nturlly to the Scriptures. There, the word hell, wh ll s medievl mteriltic ssocions, hs been used to trnslte no less thn three widely different terms. Thesere: (1) The Hebrew Sheol, for Hdes(q.v.) whsgreekequivlent th, hell in s modern significnce no fir trnsltion. (2) The Greek Tdprpot, for which, once more, hell no proper equivlent, Tdprpot being theplcetowhich rebel im mortls hve been consigned, or where the corruptrepentupforever. (3) TheGreek Gehenn(riow), the plce where the impenent suffer the penlties they hve brought upon themselves. Gehenn ssoced wh the AbstrkteAllgemeinhe,,, _. eyj Idee, II. VI.c. Allgemein, II. Logik, II. 4. Anetws,V.c. An ihm, V. c. Mle, VI./. Ansich,V. VlleyofthechildrenofHinnom,plce Ansichoderfurun,V.y. Negtion, VI.. connected trdionlly wh defilement, foul An und fur sich, V. e. Negtivot, IV. VI.e. An-und-fiirsiclein.V. t. Nichts, ness, nd VI.. corruption. For th term hell Anfheben, III.,IV.e. furnhes fir enough equivlent, becuse Objektivt, III. 4,VI.c. therecnbeltledoubttht,inthecenturies Begriff,III,VI.d....vr preceding Jesus, th vlley cme to be sso Beiiichsein, V. e. S^i*. V Beschffenhe, V. Reflection, II cedin populr Jewhusgewhtheplce Besonderhe, VI.e. ^ne" &>* VI«- where irrevocble vengence overtook the Bestimmt, V. ** Unmtelbrke, d. wicked. Bestimmthe, V. V- The clusein the Apostles Creed He - * VJ- Sein, II. VI.o. Besbinmung, V. descended into hell e. mustbetken incon ScULvn, II. VI. nection wh th subject. It probbly Concret, V.. Kc^Bestlmmu VI lte ddion to th symbol nd, hving Concrete Allgemeinhe, 8objAM)bjek^I. e. ltle Scripture wrrnt, hs been inter Subjektiver und objek- preted very vriously. The Greek Church Dsein, II. VI.. _ Denken, II. VI.d. Subjekt.y ST^inY".to techesthtthe humn soulofchrt de III Ding, II. Substntilot, VI. scendedintohelltoprechthegospelforthe redemption of those who were there on ccount of originl sin. The Romn Ctholic Church teches tht the God-Mn mde the descent in order to relese the sints of Isrel. The Lutherns hold tht the God-Mn descended onthemorning oftheresurrection only (the intervl since deth hving been pssed in Prde), nd for the purpose of pronouncing sentence on sin. The Reformed theologins regrded the expression s wholly figur tive, nd s indicting the sufferings which Chrt endured through the crucifixion. In other words, the phrse merely emph 465 iih